Evolutionary game theory predicts that cooperation in social dilemma games is promoted when agents are connected as a network. However, when networks are fixed over time, humans do not necessarily show enhanced mutual cooperation. Here we show that reinforcement learning (specifically, the so-called Bush-Mosteller model) approximately explains the experimentally observed network reciprocity and the lack thereof in a parameter region spanned by the benefit-to-cost ratio and the node's degree. Thus, we significantly extend previously obtained numerical results. * naoki.masuda@bristol.ac.uk 1 Human society is built upon cooperation among individuals. However, our society is full of social dilemmas, where cooperative actions, which are costly to individuals, appear to be superseded by non-cooperative, selfish actions that exploit cooperative others [1][2][3]. There are several mechanisms that explain cooperative behavior in social dilemma situations [4] [5] [6] . The evolutionary game theory has provided firm evidence that static networks enhance cooperation as compared to well-mixed populations under generous conditions, with the effect being called spatial reciprocity (in the case of finite-dimensional networks) and network reciprocity (in the case of general networks) [4, [7] [8] [9] [10] . This finding is in alignment with broadly made observations that humans as well as animals are reasonably considered to interact on contact networks where a node is an individual [11] [12] [13] .
and its variants called moody conditional cooperation [27, 28] . Furthermore, aspirationbased reinforcement learning, not evolutionary game theory, yielded the absence of network reciprocity in numerical simulations [29] . In the present paper, we vary the benefit-to-cost ratio and the node's degree, two key parameters in the discussion of network reciprocity in the literature, to show that aspiration-based reinforcement learning gives rise to network reciprocity under the conditions consistent with the previous experimental study [21] . In this way, we significantly extend the previous numerical results [29] .
I. MODEL A. Prisoners' dilemma game on networks
Consider players placed on nodes of a network. They repeatedly play the donation game, which is a special case of the PDG, over t max rounds as follows. In each round, each player selects either to cooperate (C) or defect (D), and a donation game occurs on each edge in both directions. The submitted action (i.e., C or D) is consistently used toward all neighbors.
On each edge, a cooperating player pays cost c to benefit the other player by b. If a player
C. BM model
We consider players that obey the Bush-Mosteller (BM) model of reinforcement learning to update actions over rounds [22] [23] [24] 26] . We use the following variant of the BM model [28, 30] . Each player has the intended probability of cooperation, p t (t = 1, . . . , t max ) as the sole internal state. Probability p t is updated in response to the payoff obtained in the previous round, denoted by r t−1 , and the previous action, denoted by a t−1 , as follows:
In Eq.
(1) the stimulus, denoted by s t−1 ∈ (−1, 1), is defined by
where β > 0 and A are the sensitivity parameter and aspiration level, respectively. The action selected in the previous round is reinforced if the realized payoff is larger than the aspiration level, i.e., r t−1 − A > 0. Conversely, if the payoff is smaller than the aspiration level, the previous action is suppressed. For example, when a player submitted C in the previous round and the obtained payoff was larger than the aspiration level, the stimulus is positive. Then, the probability of cooperation is increased in the next round [according to the first line in the RHS of Eq. (1)]. Note that the updating scheme [Eq.
(1)] guarantees p t ∈ (0, 1) if p 1 ∈ (0, 1). We set p 1 = 0.8, which roughly agrees with the observations made in the previous laboratory experiments [14, 17, 21] .
In each round, players are assumed to misimplement the action to submit the action opposite to the intention (i.e., D if the player intends C, and C if the player intends D) with probability ǫ [28, [30] [31] [32] . Thus, the actual probability of cooperation is given bỹ
II. RESULTS
We consider two values of b/c, i.e., b/c = 2 and 6 by setting (b, c) = (2, 1) and (b, c) = (6, 1), respectively.
Numerically calculated fractions of cooperative players are compared between the two treatments in Fig. 2 . When the node's degree, k, is small (i.e., k = 2) and b/c is large (i.e.,
b/c = 6), cooperation is more frequent in the static-network treatment than the shufflednetwork treatment. This result is consistent with the previous experimental results [21] .
When b/c = 2, this effect is not observed, which is also consistent with the experimental results [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] .
To examine the robustness of the results shown in Fig. 2 , we carried out simulations for a region of the A-ǫ parameter space and four values of k. We did not vary β (= 0.2) because β did not considerably alter the behavior of the players unless it took extreme values [28] .
With b/c = 2, the fraction of cooperative players averaged over the first 25 rounds is shown in As k increases, the difference between the two treatments decreases. In summary, a static as opposed to shuffled network promotes cooperation only when b/c is large and k is small.
These results are consistent with the experimental findings [21] .
Network reciprocity is attributed to assortative connectivity between cooperative players [7] [8] [9] [10] . In other words, cooperation can thrive if a cooperator tends to find other cooperators at the neighboring nodes. To measure this effect, we defined the assortment by P (C|C; t) − P (C|D; t), where P (C|C; t) is the probability that a neighbor of a cooperative player is cooperative in round t, and P (C|D; t) is the probability that a neighbor of a defective player is cooperative in round t [21, 33] . In the shuffled treatment, we confirmed that the assortment was ≈ 0 in the entire parameter region.
III. CONCLUSIONS
We have numerically shown that an aspiration-based reinforcement learning model, the BM model, produces network reciprocity if and only if the benefit-to-cost ratio in the donation game is large relative to the node's degree. The results are consistent with the previous experimental findings [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] . In addition to network reciprocity, the BM model also accounts for the conditional cooperation, which is hard to explain by evolutionary game theory [27, 28, 34] . Aspiration-based reinforcement learning may be able to describe cooperative behavior of humans and animals in broader contexts. Finally, we remark that, although network reciprocity is not observed in the shuffled-network treatment, in both theory and experiments, dynamic linking treatments that allow players to strategically sever and create links promote cooperation in laboratory experiments [17, [35] [36] [37] [38] . Evolutionary game theory predicts cooperation under dynamic linking [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] . Reinforcement learning may also account for enhanced cooperation under dynamic linking. 
